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DRUG URINALYSIS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: GOING
BEYOND T.L.O.
Against the child's interest in privacy must be set the substantial in-
terest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the class-
room and on school grounds. Maintaining order in the classroom has
never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken par-
ticularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have
become major social problems.'
Schools represent unique settings whereby educators are not only re-
quired to foster learning of basic subject matter but also to provide discipline
and safety for the students under their care. Teachers and administrators must
make long term as well as instantaneous decisions affecting the enforcement of
school regulations and applicable law. They must exercise control but do so
without trampling the rights of the students. Drugs, as the Supreme Court
recognized, have become a widespread problem and a variety of tactics have
been adopted to eliminate them from schools.
In addition to locker searches, drug detection dogs, body and strip searches,
urinalysis has been introduced into the schools. In Arkadelphia and Hope,
Arkansas, students in grades five through twelve who are suspected of taking
drugs are asked to submit to urinalysis tests.2 Students found to possess drugs
must withdraw from school for a semester or face expulsion.' Several students
have had to submit to the tests in Arkadelphia and refusal to do so also results
in expulsion. A female student was required to provide a urine sample in the
presence of a school secretary." Understandably, some of the parents believed
the constitutional rights of their children were violated and requested
assistance from the American Civil Liberties Union.5
The parents and students contend6 the policies violate the fourth, fifth and
fourteenth amendments.7 They argue that such tests are illegal searches, that
'New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. 733, 742 (1985).
2Silas, School Drug Tests: Arkansas Policy Challenged, 70 A.B.A.J., Apr. 1984, at 36.
3Id.
4
relephone interviews with attorney Robert M. Cearley, Jr. (Feb. 21, 1985) and with attorney Clayton R.
Blackstock, of Cearley, Mitchell and Roachell, Little Rock, Arkansas (May 9 and 17, 1985), who, on behalf
of the American Civil Liberties Union, represent plaintiffs against the Arkadelphia School District and
several of its officials. In their fourth amended complaint plaintiffs seek, first, declaratory and injunctive
relief contending that the drug testing policies are unreasonable searches and seizures and deny them due
process thus violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States;
and second, damages for violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See, Anable v Ford,
No. 84-6033 (W.D. Ark. filed Feb. 29, 1984).
'Silas, supra note 2, at 36. This article also indicates that if a student is suspected of alcoholic intoxication he
is required to take a breath test administered by the police.
O'elephone interview, supra note 4.
'Silas, supra note 2, at 36.
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they compel self-incrimination,8 and that they abridge due process re-
quirements.9
While much has already been written on the self incrimination and due
process rights of students, this comment will focus upon the unique fourth
amendment questions that are raised by the introduction of urinalysis in the
public schools context. For example, do students have a privacy interest in
their own body fluids? If so, how intrusive is a urinalysis, and what standard
should govern the educator in his attempt to utilize this testing method? Over-
all, this comment will explore the permissibility of the use of urinalysis to con-
trol drugs in the public schools and will conclude that probable cause should be
the standard by which to measure the reasonableness of the "search."
The approach taken here will be to discuss briefly the fourth amendment,
review traditional doctrines involving school searches, 0 analyze the recent
United States Supreme Court decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O.," describe the
relevant issues in a urinalysis search and recommend the standard by which
such procedures should be judged.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The fourth amendment 2 contains several distinct elements which bear
upon any analysis of the legality of a search. The fourth amendment, as ap-
plied in federal or state proceedings, cannot be triggered unless the search is ac-
complished through government action.' Furthermore, the victim of the
search must possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in whatever is
8See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). There is also some debate as to whether giving a sample of body
fluid constitutes self-incrimination at all. Since self-incrimination has usually been said to relate to the com-
pulsion to communicate, the giving of real or physical evidence may not be prohibited by the fifth amend-
ment. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2265 (McNaughton rev.
ed., 1961). Eckhardt, Intrusion Into The Body. 52 MIL.L.REV. 141, 154 (1971).
9See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (property and liberty interests require procedural due process);
Schiff, The Emergence of Student Rights to Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 34 BAYLOR L. REV.
209, 212 (1982); See generally Mass, Due Process Rights of Students: Limitations on Goss v. Lopez - A
Retreat Out of the "Thicket, "9 J.L. & EDUC. 449 (1980).
"Since there are no reported cases as of the time of this writing on drug urinalysis in the schools, this Com-
ment will, of necessity, have to extrapolate by judging the nature and scope of other school search methods
and how the courts have analyzed them.
"105 S.Ct. 733 (1985), (argued March 28, 1984, reargued Oct. 2, 1984).
2U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
"The fourth amendment was found to apply to the states in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) and Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). The exclusionary rule also applies to the states. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
'See Burdeau v. McDowell. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
[Vol. 18:4
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searched. I" Privacy may be thought of as the right to control the "intimacies
about ourselves."' 6 However, the privacy expectation must be one which
"society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."' 7
Once governmental action is in issue, and a privacy interest recognized,
then the inquiry goes to the reasonableness of the search. 8 The prevailing view
is that any search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless it falls
within one of the few recognized exceptions. 9 The test for a warrant has been
construed to mean "probable cause" - the belief, by a prudent person, that a
crime has been committed and that evidence of the crime will be found on the
person or within the article to be searched.2" In broad terms, the exceptions to
the warrant-probable cause requirements can be classed as minimally intrusive
or can be justified by a balancing test that carefully weighs the privacy interest
against the government's need to search."
II. TRADITIONAL SCHOOL DOCTRINE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Despite the fact that the fourth amendment refers to "persons," it fre-
quently has been held inapplicable to students searched by educators.22 This is
not surprising considering that juveniles have been treated differently in
numerous other contexts of the law. This inequality in treatment has often ex-
tended to some of the most fundamental constitutional protections which are
taken as sacrosanct when applied to adults. 3 However, as the United States
Supreme Court declared in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school
house gate."2' The Supreme Court, in finding the first amendment applicable
to students, indicated that students are indeed "persons" within the context of
11C.H. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS 102,
109 (1980). See generally W.R. LAFAVE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1978). 1 W.E. RINGEL,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS. (2d ed. 1981).
"Gardner, Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom - Perspectives on Fourth Amendment Scope. 74
Nw.U.L.REv. 803, 848 (1980).
"Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
"WHITEBREAD, supra note 15, at 102.
"Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983).
"Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
"Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). See WHITEBREAD.
supra note 15, at 108, where six search exceptions are listed: (I) incident to lawful arrest, (2) automobile
search, (3) hot pursuit or emergency situations, (4) by consent, (5) stop and frisk, or (6) plain view.
'See generally Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools. 59 IOWA L. REV.
739 (1974); Phay & Rogister, Searches of Students and the Fourth Amendment, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 57 (1976);
Trosch, Williams & DeVore, Public Searches and the Fourth Amendment, I I J.L. & EDUC. 41 (1982).
"Comment, Public School Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 9 U. DAYTON L.REv. 521, 523-24 (1984);
Buss, supra note 22, at 811.
2393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
Spring, 19851 COMMENTS
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the Constitution.25 In several relatively recent decisions the Court has extended
other constitutional protections to juveniles. 6
Nevertheless, while recognizing that students are "persons," the Court
has stopped short of granting them full protection in the schools. The Court
has indicated, for example, that schools are special settings, such that the
eighth amendment does not prohibit corporal punishment." Similarly,
numerous decisions in state and federal courts apply relaxed fourth amend-
ment standards to school searches. But the states compel attendance and
association with other students and therefore are under a duty to provide a safe
and secure environment.28
To illustrate the dilemma faced by the schools, a few of the more notable
cases will be discussed below. In Doe v. Renfrow, 9 school officials were in-
creasingly concerned about drug use. In response they brought in specially
trained dogs to the junior and senior high schools, detained the students and
systematically brought the dogs into each classroom. The sniffer dogs ap-
proached each student to detect any odor of marijuana. A dog gave an alert
that it detected marijuana on the plaintiff. She was required to empty her
pockets and purse but the officials failed to find any contraband. She was then
escorted to a private room where she was subjected to a nude search which still
did not produce any drugs. Officials subsequently discovered that earlier that
morning she had been playing with her own dog which was in heat and provid-
ed the scent which "alerted" the sniffer dog?0
The federal court found that use of the drug detection dogs did not con-
stitute a search since they were merely checking the air around the students.
Furthermore, the alert provided by the dog gave rise to a reasonable suspicion
that the student possessed marijuana which justified a search of the pockets
and purse. However, the court found that the nude search far exceeded
reasonable discretion and that the educators had acted irresponsibly."
1id. at 511.
"See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (when a juvenile is charged with a crime he is entitled to many Bill of
Rights protections including notice of the charge, representation by counsel, privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to confront the witnesses); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (in criminal
charges against a minor the state has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975) (students are entitled to procedural due process).
"Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
3 W.R. LAFAVE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 458 (1978).
29475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981)
(The Court of Appeals reversed only on the issue of the immunity of the cducators and their defense of good
faith).
"Id. See Comment, The Need for Judicial Restriction on the Use of Drug Detecting Canines, 17 AKRON L.
REV. 739, 746-49 (1984); Ashman, Public Schools .... Canine Sniffing, 68 A.B.A.J. 1311 (1982); Note,
Searches by Drug Detection Dogs in Pennsylvania Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 85 DICK. L.
REV. 143 (1980); Note, The Constitutionality of Canine Searches in the Classroom, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 39 (1980); Ashman, Student Drug Searches, 66 A.B.A.J. 386 (1980).
3Doe v. Renfrow 631 F.2d at 92-3. The Court of Appeals went on to say that such a search "is a violation of
[Vol. 18:4
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In Belinier v. Lund, 32 someone in the fifth grade class at the Auburn, New
York elementary school complained that he was missing three dollars. Teach-
ers searched the coats, desks, bags, personal articles and ultimately took the
students to restrooms and made them strip to their undergarments. They never
found the money. The court held that the strip search was improper because
the teachers lacked individualized suspicion. Such an extensive search needed
more particularized facts.3 Yet it appears that the court would have approved
the search as to one particular student without probable cause or a warrant.
In Zamora v. Pomeroy," the court approved the use of canines in sniffing
students' lockers for the presence of marijuana." The court reasoned that the
school administrators have a duty to maintain an educational atmosphere
which necessitates a reasonable right of inspection.36
In Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 11 a canine contra-
band detection group came into the school to sniff both lockers and students.
The court denounced the search as an "intrusion on dignity and personal
security" but founded its main objection on the dragnet approach used by the
officials.3 It appears that if there had been individual suspicion, a search
without probable cause or a warrant, initiated by sniffer dogs, would have met
approval by the court.
Underlying the reasoning of the state and federal courts can be found
three major doctrines that have been used to justify a relaxation of fourth
amendment requirements. First, the courts have perceived the actions of
school officials as taken in place of the students' parents. The doctrine of in
loco parentis has been given judicial approval in numerous instances where a
search is conducted in a manner that would have been impermissible if im-
posed upon an adult.39 Several states have, in fact, codified in loco parentis. 
°
At the heart of in loco parentis is the belief that it "is so compelling in light of
public necessity and as a social concept antidating the Fourth Amendment,
that any action, including a search, taken thereunder upon reasonable suspi-
any known principle of human decency." Id. at 93. See O'Daniel, Juvenile Strip Searches in Public Schools,
14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 826 (1980).
3438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
331d.
14639 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1981).
"See Zirkel & Gluckman, A Legal Brief. Student Searches, 65 NASSP BULL., Sept. 1981, at 109.
"But see State v. Engerud, 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983), cert. granted, 464 U.S. 712 (1983) (Locker
searched by educator on anonymous tip was found unreasonable and evidence suppressed in criminal pros-
ecution; death of Engerud prevented hearing by United States Supreme Court).
11690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983). See Note, Drug Use In Schools, 7 J. Juv.
L. 222 (1983).
"Horton, 690 F.2d at 482.
"See, e.g., In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska
App. 1982); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969).
wSchiff, supra note 9, at 210.
Spring, 19851 COMMENTS
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cion should be accepted as necessary and reasonable. 4
In Mercer v. State, 2 the court determined that a principal who, acting on
a tip that the student possessed marijuana, searched the student's pockets did
so within constitutional limitations. His search was in loco parentis - as if per-
formed by the student's own parents. Since parental searches clearly do not
constitute governmental action the fourth amendment's protections are not
triggered. 3
Hybrid reasoning is sometimes used whereby in loco parentis is weighed
against fourth amendment restrictions. For example, in In re W," the
educator's search of a locker for marijuana was judged by balancing in loco
parentis against fourth amendment standards of reasonableness. Thus, in this
vein of analysis the fourth amendment is not rendered inapplicable but is re-
laxed by a balancing test.45
Critics of in loco parentis have argued that the parent-child and teacher-
child relationship are quite different and that parents do not actually intend to
transfer all of their discretionary powers to the child's educators.46 Further-
more, there is an absence of real protective concern when a teacher searches a
student. He is not conducting the search to protect the child but is seeking to
protect other students in the school.47 Since many states have incorporated the
doctrine by statute, there is an underlying contradiction in its application. If in
loco parentis excludes fourth amendment protections because it places the
teachers in a non-governmental status, then it is indeed odd that governmental
action was used to solidify the doctrine. 8
A second traditional approach used to exclude fourth amendment protec-
tions from school searches is the private citizen theory. While it was used less
frequently than in loco parentis, and often somewhat confused with the latter,
it brought the same result. Here, the educator conducting the search is not
necessarily acting in place of the parent but is simply acting as a private
citizen. 9 Since governmental action would not be involved in the activity,
fourth amendment restrictions would not apply."
"People v. Jackson, 65 Misc.2d 909, 913, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731, 735 (1971), affd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d
153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972).
42450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
"Id.; See LAFAVE, supra note 28, at 454.
"29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973).
"'Buss, supra note 22, at 768-69.
"*Id. at 769 n. 191.
41Id. at 768.
'Comment, supra note 23, at 527. See also Note, Balancing In Loco Parentis and the Constitution, 26 U.
FLA. L. REV. 271 (1974); Note, Search and Seizure - School Officials' Authority to Search Students Is
Augmented by the In Loco Parentis Doctrine, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 526 (1977).
"Buss, supra note 22, at 766.
"See In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969).
[Vol. 18:4
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The major fallacy underlying the private citizen approach is that the
educator derives the very authority by which he conducts the search from the
state. His very presence in the school is in the capacity of a government
employee." Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court in Camara v.
Municipal Court2 gave additional recognition to the concept that governmen-
tal action for fourth amendment purposes need not be limited to searches by
police authorities. In fact, minimally intrusive searches of dwellings by health
officers were held to require warrants.53
The third common doctrine that has been extensively used to justify
relaxation of fourth amendment protections incorporates the concept that the
schools are special settings. As a unique environment the school gathers im-
mature individuals who may not be capable of self-restraint of their behavior
and who are mandated to attend by state law. The situation requires that
school authorities be given broad powers to manage these juveniles."4 Thus,
fourth amendment protections must be relaxed, but not disregarded. Given the
schools' special environment, searches need not be done under traditional stan-
dards of warrants and probable cause. Rather, the test has become one of
reasonableness or "reasonable suspicion."55 Among the state courts and federal
courts, there has been a variety of attempts to standardize the reasonable suspi-
cion test.56 As will be discussed below, the United States Supreme Court in
TL.O. endorsed a modified approach to reasonableness.
III. NEW JERSEY v. T.L.O.
This Supreme Court decision represents its most comprehensive attempt
to deal with school searches. The incident which gave rise to the litigation
began with a teacher's observation of Terry Lee Owen and another student
smoking in the restroom at Piscataway High School in Piscataway, New
Jersey.57 They were brought to the Principal's office where Assistant Vice Prin-
"Buss, supra note 22, at 766.
52387 U.S. 523 (1967).
"While the Court required probable cause to obtain the warrant the standard could be met by simple
legislative recognition that violations were likely to be found. Id. at 539.
"Note, Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure - School Officials May Conduct Student Searches Upon
Satisfaction of Reasonableness Test in Order to Maintain Educational Environment (In re T.L.O.. N.J
1983), 14 SETON HALL 738, 748-49 (1984).
I'LAFAVE, supra note 28, at 456-57.
"See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1984); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984);
Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103 S.Ct. 3536 (1983);
Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971);
State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975). But see State v. Mora, 307
So. 2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976) (Full fourth amend-
ment protections and the exclusionary rule were extended to school search situation).
'ITL.O., 105 S.Ct. at 736; See also Stewart, And in Her Purse the Principal Found Marijuana, 71 A.B.A.J.,
Feb. 1985, at 50, 51.
COMMENTSSpring, 19851
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cipal Theodore Choplick questioned the girls. While Owen's companion admit-
ted violating school rules, Owen denied that she had been smoking and claimed
that she did not smoke at all.58
Mr. Choplick asked Owen to come into his office where he demanded to
see her purse. Upon opening the purse, he saw a pack of cigarettes and reached
in for them. In the process, he saw rolling papers which he associated with
marijuana use. With additional suspicion now aroused he proceeded to search
the purse thoroughly. He found a pouch of marijuana, several one-dollar bills,
a card that listed students who owed her money and two letters implicating
Owen in marijuana dealing. Choplick then called Owen's parents and the
police. At police headquarters with her mother, Owen confessed to selling
marijuana at the school.59
The state subsequently brought delinquency charges against Owen on the
basis of her confession and the evidence seized by Mr. Choplick. The juvenile
court denied her motion to suppress the evidence which she claimed had been
unlawfully seized. While recognizing that the fourth amendment applies to
school searches, the juvenile court held that a school official only needs "rea-
sonable suspicion" that a crime was being committed or that a school regula-
tion needed enforcement in order to conduct a lawful search.1 Since Choplick's
original decision to open the purse was justified, his continued search after see-
ing evidence associated with marijuana use was also justified. 6'
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the judgment and
ordered the evidence suppressed. It agreed with the lower courts that a war-
rantless search by an educator does not in itself violate the fourth amendment.
It also agreed that a school official only needs "reasonable grounds to believe
that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity or activity that would in-
terfere with school discipline and order."62 However, the court found, with twojustices dissenting, that Choplick's search of the purse was unreasonable. The
majority believed that the contents of Owen's purse were irrelevant to the
question of whether she had been smoking in the bathroom since possession of
cigarettes did not constitute a violation of school rules. Furthermore, even if
the initial search was justified, continued probing after the discovery of the
cigarettes and the rolling papers was unreasonable.63
The original petition by the state for certiorari only posed the question
whether the exclusionary rule should "operate to bar consideration in juvenile
mT.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 736-37.
"Id. at 737.
'ld.; See State ex. rel. T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 428 A.2d 1327 (1980).
6"T.L.O, 105 S.Ct. at 737.
61d. at 738; See State ex. rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 346, 463 A.2d 934, 941-42 (1983).
"State ex.rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942.
(Vol. 18:4
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delinquency proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a school official
without the involvement of law enforcement officers."6 However, the
Supreme Court ordered reargument on the question "Did the assistant prin-
cipal violate the Fourth Amendment in opening respondent's purse in the facts
and circumstances of this case?" 65
The Court's plurality decision" reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court
and found that the search of Owen's purse was indeed reasonable. The Court's
opinion substantially agreed with the New Jersey court's test for
reasonableness of the search but instead attacked the application of the test to
the facts of the case:
We believe that the New Jersey court's application of the standard to
strike down the search of T.L.O.'s purse reflects a somewhat crabbed no-
tion of reasonableness. Our view of the facts surrounding the search leads
us to conclude that the search was in no sense unreasonable for Fourth
Amendment purposes.
In reaching its holding, the Court provided an extensive review of school
search doctrine. In particular, Justice White attacked the assertions that the
fourth amendment does not apply to school officials because they act in loco
parentis or in a private capacity. He emphasized that the fourth amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies without question to
school officials." Quoting from Camara v. Municipal Court, Justice White
asserted that "'the basic purpose of the Amendment, as recognized in countless
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. ' ' 69 Continuing his at-
tack, Justice White indicated that "school officials act as representatives of the
State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the
parents' immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment."' °
The Court, however, while finding the fourth amendment applicable to
school officials, stopped short of requiring probable cause, warrants or both for
searches of public school students. Instead, the Court recognized, in part, the
traditional doctrine that considers schools a unique environment requiring a
relaxation of fourth amendment protections. The Court asserted that
"[a]gainst the child's interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of
teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on
"T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 738.
"New Jersey v. T.L.O., 104 S.Ct. 3583 (1984). (Blackmun, Stevens, Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
"White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court but Powell, J., and Blackmun, J., each wrote concurring opin-
ions (Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
"TLO.. 105 S.Ct. at 745.
Old at 739-41.
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school grounds."'" Thus, the Court recognized that public school students have
privacy interests worthy of protection and that an educator's search is indeed
governmental action. 2 Once these two elements are found, the query must
then focus upon whether the search in question is "reasonable.'" 3 Further-
more, the Court found that "'probable cause' was not an irreducible require-
ment of a valid search. 7 4 Therefore, as in a number of other situations, the
Court recognized the legality of a search based only on suspicion, while
"reasonable," but not reaching the level of probable cause.75
The Court, therefore, fashioned a test for reasonableness in school search
situations. First, the search must be justified at its inception. That is, that there
will be reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will reveal evidence
that the student "violated or is violating the law or rules of the school."76
The second prong of the test is to determine if the search is "reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified interference in the first
place."77 To gauge the scope of the search, a query must be made along two
somewhat vague parameters. First, the measures adopted must be related to
the objectives of the search. Second, the search must not be excessively in-
trusive in light of the student's age, sex and the nature of the infraction.78
The Court limited its holding to a finding that the search of Owen's purse
was valid and left several issues unresolved. The Court warned that it was not
addressing whether a schoolchild has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
lockers or desks79; what standard should be used for "assessing the legality of
searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of
law enforcement agencies" 0; whether the "exclusionary rule applies to the
fruits of unlawful searches conducted by school authorities""; and, whether
"individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard
we adopt for searches by school authorities.""
In applying its own standard of reasonableness, the T.L.O. Court exam-
ined the sequences of the search of Owen's purse. In being told by a teacher
that Owen had been smoking, Mr. Choplick's initial search of the purse for
11ld. at 742.
"Id. at 743.
7"C.H. WHITEHEAD, supra note 15, at 109. See generally, W.R. LAFAVE, supra note 15.
1
4T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 743.
75/d.
161d. at 744.
"Id (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
781d.
71d. at 741 n.5.
"'Id. at 744 n.7.
"'Id. at 739 n.3.
"Id. at 744 n.8.
[Vol. 18:4
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cigarettes was reasonable. Reaching in to grasp the cigarettes was a natural
reaction which then revealed evidence providing suspicion that marijuana
would be found by further inquiry. "The relevance of T.L.O's possession of
cigarettes to the question whether she had been smoking and to the credibility
of her denial that she smoked supplied the necessary 'nexus' between the item
searched for and the infraction under investigation."83 The Court further ex-
plained that "reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty:
'sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment. ...
Justice Blackmun, concurring, felt it necessary to qualify the T.L.O.
balancing test to justify a relaxation of fourth amendment protections. He
warned that the tone of the TL.O. Court's opinion implied that balancing tests
were the rule rather than the exception. He would have placed greater em-
phasis on the school as a special and unique setting that simply made warrants
and reasonableness based on probable cause unworkable. Therefore, he would
have likened the school search to special circumstances such as is found in
"stop and frisk" cases.85
In their dissent to the T.L.O. holding, Justices Stevens, Marshall and
Brennan, in part, expressed a concern for possible abuses of the reasonableness
test. They fear that full searches for very trivial infractions can result in serious
intrusions into a student's privacy.1 Justices Stevens and Marshall would use a
tougher standard for permissibility of student searches. Thus, they would only
allow a search when the educator has reason to believe that the search "will
uncover evidence that the student is violating the law or engaging in conduct
that is seriously disruptive of school order, or the educational process."87
Justice Brennan would provide an even stricter test. He expressed concern
that the T.L.O. holding would invite a "free-for-all." 8 He agrees that the school
environment is a unique situation which would provide an exception only to
the warrant requirement. He maintains that educators should still be held to a
standard of probable cause before being permitted to conduct student
searches. 9
Overall, the justices are unanimous that the fourth amendment applies to
the schools, that when educators conduct a search they are acting in the name
of the state, that students have recognizable privacy interests (at least to their
persons) and that warrants need not be obtained to conduct a valid search. On-
1d. at 746.
Id. (quoting Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)).
"Id. at 748-50.
"ld. at 759.
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ly Justice Brennan would hold the school employees to a standard of probable
cause. The standard of reasonableness to be followed, even if using Justices
Stevens' and Marshall's slightly more rigorous approach, still leaves many
questions unsettled. It seems that the private action and in loco parentis doc-
trines have been put to rest. However, many of the state and federal courts
were already employing various degrees of a "reasonable suspicion" standard."
The effect of the T.L.O. holding is to bring into closer focus a balancing of the
student's privacy interests against the state's interest in safety and discipline in
the schools. Future litigation will progress on a case by case basis as lawyers
and judges grapple with the blurred parameters of reasonableness set out by
the T.L.O. court.
IV. SEARCHING FOR DRUGS WITH URINALYSIS
One of the first cases that may explore the limits of the T.L.O. test is pend-
ing in the United States District Court, Western Division, in Arkansas. Ezell v.
Ford, sub nom, Anable v. Ford,9' as mentioned in the discussion above, in-
volved the implementation of urinalysis testing on students suspected of taking
drugs. It is by now clear that such testing by school employees is governmental
action for purposes of the fourth amendment. Therefore, the two remaining
queries must explore whether a student has a privacy interest in his own body
fluids and whether any standard of reasonableness would permit or justify this
type of search.
The privacy issue appears to be the least challenging aspect of the inquiry.
The Supreme Court found a recognizable privacy interest in the contents of
T.L.O.'s purse.92 Other courts have, for example, recognized privacy interests
in students being forced to remove all clothing;93 in the removal of part of the
clothing or a searching through it;94 and, in some cases, in students' lockers."
It is, at first, tempting to look at whether privacy interests in body fluids
have been recognized in adult search cases. However, the volumes of litigation
on school searches indicate caution is wise on this issue. As Justice Powell in-
dicates in his concurring opinion in T.L.O.: "It is simply unrealistic to think
that students have the same subjective expectation of privacy as the popula-
tion generally." Many commentators on student privacy would find a clearly
recognizable privacy interest in the chemical content of a student's urine.
William G. Buss, in his seminal article on the fourth amendment's applicability
"See supra note 56.
"See supra note 4.
'I2TL.O., 105 S.Ct. 741-42.
"See supra note 29.
'See supra note 56.
"See supra note 36.
6T.L.O.. 105 S.Ct. at 747.
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to the public schools, indicates that privacy interests are not factual expecta-
tions but are instead what a person ought to be entitled to expect.9"
Martin R. Gardner, in his comprehensive work on fourth amendment
perspectives on canine use in the schools, gives specific examples of privacy in-
terests: "excretory functions and aspects relating thereto are considered
especially intimate such that intrusions into one's privacy in these areas is a
source of extreme distress and indignity."98 Professor Gardner indicates that
the fourth amendment carries with it certain implied "subrights."99 One of
these "subrights" is the right to be free from "indecent intrusions."1'
Considering the types of privacy interests recognized by the courts in
prior school search cases, it will be assumed for the purposes of the analysis
below that a student has a recognizably strong expectation of privacy in the
chemical contents of his body fluids.
There remains, however, the need to explore the reasonableness standards
that may be applicable to a urinalysis test in the public school. First, a few
words are in order to describe the mechanics of a urinalysis for purposes of
determining the scope of such a search.
A urinalysis is not the type of test that can be administered for instantane-
ous analysis when the presence of drugs (usually marijuana) is in issue. While
simple urine tests have been administered with instantaneous results at doc-
tors' offices for many years, the detection of drugs involves a substantially
greater degree of scientific sophistication available only at testing
laboratories. 0'
A person must discharge urine in a vessel which, at times, is required to be
witnessed'02 to avoid possible tampering and other evidentiary problems. 03 The
vessel is sent to a laboratory which will usually conduct one of two types of
tests: gas chromatography with mass spectrometry or gas chromatography
with flame ionization detector. °4 The presence of many drugs in urine are diffi-
cult to detect and, consequently, the complex tests may increase chances for
error. Furthermore, there is still a possibility that the process (as to its accu-
'"Buss, supra note 22, at 763.
"Gardner, supra note 16, at 849.
"Id. at 844.
Iwld.
oISee generally Wiesner, Urinalysis: Defense Approaches, 15 ADVOCATE 114 (1983). (Excellent resource for
detailed scientific aspects of urinalysis).
mSee supra text accompanying note 4.
Since the sample must be sent to a lab for analysis, it raises a host of possible evidentiary challenges. For
example, chain of custody, examination of lab technicians, demand for production of the sample for own
analysis, expert witnesses, etc.
" Wiesner, supra note 101, at 114-17. See 22 Am. JUR., P.O.F. Instrumental Analysis §5.5 (Supp. 1984).
"'Wiesner, supra note 101, at 119-21.
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racy for detecting drugs) may be challenged as "novel scientific" evidence."
However, the admissibility of the results of the testing in the criminal litigation
context is gaining recognition. A positive test result may be considered circum-
stantial evidence of possession.0 7 At best, the test creates a rebuttable presump-
tion. 08
In a non-judicial setting, it is difficult to estimate how much weight is
given to such testing. If a student is tested positively but only school
disciplinary action is taken, there will most likely be little opportunity for
challenging the results. Most parents would not have the resources or inclina-
tion to invoke such a challenge.'0 Thus, the possibility of abuse or error would
probably increase if the test and all of its evidentiary ramifications were not
subjected to the rigors of trial.
Returning now to the question of the reasonableness for the use of such a
test in the public schools, the urinalysis "search" will be plugged into the
TL.O. Court's standard. The first prong of the T.L.O. analysis, as discussed
above, is to determine if the search is justified at its inception; that is, where
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will reveal evidence
that the student "violated or is violating either the law or rules of the school.""'
"Reasonable suspicion" is not a new concept and has been applied by
many of the state and federal courts who have heard school search cases."
Nevertheless, the concept escapes clear definition. W.R. LaFave indicates that
the reasonable suspicion necessary for the search of a student is that which is
"a quantum of evidence somewhat short of that which is needed for the usual
police search.""' The concept implicitly incorporates "good faith" on the part
of the educator and practically mandates that the reasonableness of the suspi-
cion to be analyzed on a case by case common sense approach.
By way of illustration, Martin Schiff discusses the Georgia court's finding
that reasonable suspicion was the perception (by the educator) of an "'obvious
consciousness of guilt.""'" On the other hand, there was no justifiable
reasonable suspicion in a student suspected of being a drug dealer in his mak-
ing two quick trips to the bathroom."'
101d.
'*'See United States v. Yanez, 89 N.M. 397, 553 P.2d 252 (1976).
'Wiesner, supra note 101, at 125.
'See supra note 9.
"*TLO., 105 S.Ct. at 744.
"See LAFAVE, supra note 28, at 456-57; and see supra note 56.
"ILAFAVE, supra note 28, at 456.
"'Schiff, supra note 9, at 215 (quoting State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975)).
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To gain some feel for this elusive concept, it is helpful to examine the
T.L.O. Court's perception of how a search is justified at its inception. Owen
was seen by a teacher smoking in the bathroom. Hence, this was reasonable
enough suspicion for Mr. Choplick to initiate the search of her purse. Next, his
discovery of rolling papers gave additional justification to a full blown search
of the purse."' The Court indicated that such suspicions arise out of a
"'common-sense conclusion about human behavior' upon which 'practical peo-
ple - including government officials - are entitled to rely.
'
"1'6
Assuming for the purposes of discussion that an educator had reasonable
suspicion that a student had taken drugs, could he properly demand a
urinalysis? The secong prong of the T.L.O. Court's test is then triggered: that
the search be reasonably related in scope to circumstances that justified in-
terference in the first place."7 This second prong of the test has, as discussed
above, two distinct steps. First, an analysis must be made as to whether the
measures adopted (urinalysis) are reasonably related to the objectives of the
search"' (presence of drugs).
It can be argued that a urinalysis clearly is related to a determination of
whether a student has ingested drugs. Urinalysis would simply involve a
chemical process to detect traces of the prohibited substance. The reliability of
the tests are another subject and has been alluded to earlier. For the sake of
discussion, it will be assumed that the test is reliable enough to sustain eviden-
tiary challenges. Bridging this assumption, the last prong of the TL.0. Court's
standard will be addressed.
The search must not be excessively intrusive in light of the student's age
and sex and the nature of the infraction." 9 The student's age and sex do not ap-
pear to be an obstacle to the urinalysis if all other criteria for the search have
been satisfied. Furthermore, the nature of the infraction would not seem to be
troublesome. Drugs in the schools have received great notoriety and are of
grave concern. The Supreme Court has recognized this and it is the very
substance of the incident that gave rise to the T.L.O. litigation.'
The intrusiveness of the search, however, deserves careful focus. It is
already clear that students have legitimate expectations of privacy and would
probably include the privacy of the content of body fluids, but the urinalysis
goes beyond simple chemical analysis. It is the act of having to deliver up the
sample, sometimes in front of a witness, that must also be considered. To ob-
'T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 747.
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tain a feel for the extent of intrusiveness it is helpful to view other situations
where body fluids are examined.
In some prisons, inmates are tested for drug ingestion. In Ferguson v.
Cardwell, "I the court found that blood may be drawn from prisoners suspected
of taking drugs if no force is used, the facilities are sanitary and if done by
medical personnel. However, in Storms v. Coughlin,' the United States
District Court found that random urinalysis tests at the prison would be per-
missible on less than probable cause since body cavity searches need not rise to
probable cause standards.' While public school students are not equivalent to
prisoners, such cases indicate that at least in certain situations body fluid
analyses are permissible as against adults without warrants or probable cause,
but only under extreme conditions.
In the realm of drunk driving litigation, urinalysis is permitted without
necessitating warrants. For the most part, these situations involve direct police
involvement and such tests are often mandated by statute under the concept of
implied consent.'24 However, in Briethaupt v. Abram, "I Chief Justice Warren
(dissenting) indicated that:
We should, in my opinion, hold that due process means at least that law-
enforcement officers in their effort to obtain evidence from persons
suspected of crime must stop short of bruising the body, breaking skin,
puncturing tissue or extracting body fluids, whether they contemplate do-
ing it by force or by stealth. 26
In Schmerber v. California, "I the issue concerned the drawing of blood of
someone suspected of intoxication after a serious car accident. While the court
ultimately found the blood sample and resulting positive reading as valid, some
clear remarks from the court assist in judging the degree of intrusiveness in-
volved in body fluid analyses. The Schmerber Court found no self-incrim-
ination problems since the blood was neither testimony nor communication.
However, before approving the body fluid extraction, the Court insisted that
such intrusions cannot be left to the standard of "mere chance" that evidence
of intoxication would be found. Instead, the court required a "clear indication
that evidence will be found."' There is no doubt that the Court considered
any intrusion into the body for evidence an extremely serious undertaking.
11392 F. Supp. 750 (D. Ariz. 1975).
122600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
'"Here the court relied on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
14See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4511.191(A) (Baldwin 1979).
1-352 U.S. 432 (1957).
"'Id. at 442.
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A final area that may be viewed for guidance is the use of urinalysis in the
military. The armed forces use civilian standards to judge permissibility of the
extraction of blood or urine and any subsequent use of it in formal pro-
ceedings. The military has collected urine samples as part of its health and
welfare program. However, the samples are taken under strict chain of custody
procedures enabling use of the evidence against the serviceman in the event
drug presence was detected."9
Arguments against such tactics have been forcefully voice in the law jour-
nal published by the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps, The Ad-
vocate. Since military personnel are compelled and conditioned to obey orders,
they are in an inferior position to resist demands to produce urine samples 3'
(not entirely unlike public school students compelled to attend under com-
pulsory education laws). Nevertheless, they are entitled to some fourth amend-
ment protections. Assuming that an expectation of privacy exists in a ser-
vicemember's body fluids, then, as in the school situation, the permissibility
turns upon the reasonableness of the search. The extent of the privacy interest
bears upon the question of reasonableness:
The primary privacy interest at issue in the context of taking urine
samples is in protecting body fluids contained within one's person from
seizure and chemical analysis. An intrusion into the body is recognized as
being an intrusion upon the integrity and dignity of a human being. Body
fluids such as urine are closely tied to bodily functions which are con-
sidered to be particularly intimate. 1'
Finally, it is argued that while drugs in the military are a major problem,
there are various other methods available. To detect the presence of drugs,
lockers may be searched, barracks inspected and the use of drug detection dogs
may be employed. In considering the wide range of alternative measures at the
commander's disposal, it is "difficult to show why urinalysis should be permit-
ted, given the degree of intrusion involved."''
It is clear that a urinalysis represents a significant degree of intrusion into
a person's expectation of privacy. As demonstrated above, in other contexts
such as in prison, DWI investigations and the military, intrusions into the body
for evidence is regarded as one of the most severe shocks to individual privacy
interests. While the courts have not flatly prohibited such intrusions, they
review their use with great care.
Commentators and judges of the schoolhouse search cases also bring
'See Maizel, Urinalysis: Search and Seizure Aspects, 14 ADVOCATE 402 (1982).
mid. at 406.
.mId. at 410. See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
"
2Maizel, supra note 129, at 418.
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some guidance to the inquiry into the degree of allowable intrusiveness. In
commenting on a strip search of a student in MM v. Anker, ' the court in-
dicated that "when a teacher conducts a highly intrusive invasion such as a
strip search in this case, it is reasonable to require that probable cause be pres-
ent.' 34 In Tarter v. Raybuch, "5 the court generally discussed the limitations on
school searches and agreed that, by way of example, school officials would
have no authority to conduct a body cavity search to check for contraband. 6
It appears, then, that a determination of the degree of intrusiveness is a
balancing of interests. This leads, in almost circular reasoning, back to the first
prong of the T.L.O. test where there must be reasonable grounds for suspect-
ing that the search will reveal evidence. What is "reasonable grounds for sus-
pecting" turns partly on the degree of intrusiveness. Making full circle, the
degree of intrusiveness is judged, among other things, upon the strength of the
"reasonable grounds for suspecting" the evidence.
This is not to say that the test is unworkable, but rather that it requires an
almost simultaneous weighing of factors. A step by step standard would be
almost impossible to develop because of a shading of the elements of the
T.L. 0. test. While the T.L. 0. test is an articulation of an approach to the prob-
lem of school searches, there will be many years of continued case by case
litigation before the standard for reasonableness of a search can be brought in-
to sharper focus.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Given the vagueness of the T.L.0. test, it is anything but clear as to how
the courts will handle urinalysis in the schools. To summarize, a student has a
recognizable privacy interest in his body fluids and searches by educators are
governmental searches,' which then leads to the test for reasonableness of the
urinalysis. It appears that under certain circumstances, a request for a drug
search urinalysis could be justified at its inception (by reasonable grounds for
suspecting drug ingestion), that the scope of the urinalysis would appear
reasonable as related to the objectives of the search and that the student's age
and sex may not present obstacles for the search. However, the degree of in-
trusiveness that a urinalysis represents is the very heart of the issue and it is
upon this element of the T.L.O. test that it predictably will fail.
The greater the indignity of the search and as the degree of intrusion ex-
133607 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1979).
13Id. at 589.
135742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1984).
13Id.
"'Where searches are conducted by or with the police with a dual goal of law enforcement and school
discipline, the courts have been more willing to require full fourth amendment protection. See, e.g., W.R.
LAFAVE, supra note 15, at 180 n. 21.1 (Supp. 1984); M.J. v. State, 399 So.2d 996 (Fla. App. 1981); and Gard-
ner, supra note 16, at 817.
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tends into the realm of intimate privacy, the more likely the courts will require
a stricter standard before recognizing its validity. As the court said in Anker,
"as the intrusiveness of the search intensifies, the standard of Fourth Amend-
ment 'reasonableness' approaches probable cause, even in the school
context."3 '
If, for the sake of argument, circumstances existed that would justify
urinalysis use in the schools, does it make any difference whether a student is
coerced by threat of suspension or expulsion or is asked to voluntarily submit
to the test? In the Arkadelphia schools, the students either had to submit or
face expulsion. It appears clear that in this situation the school must meet
fourth amendment standards.
If a student is truly capable of rendering consent then he may forfeit his
fourth amendment protection."4 However, it is questionable that a student's
consent to a process that may lead to disciplinary, delinquency proceedings or
both is ever free of coercion. Students are within an authoritarian and in-
timidating atmosphere when confronted by school adminsitrators. Combined
with a student's lack of maturity, such "consent" should be viewed with suspi-
cion.' 4' In Bilbrey v. Brown, '4 the court found that a fifth grader's consent to a
search was invalid as a matter of law because of coercive circumstances.'43
If school authorities employ drug urinalysis tests and, as predicted, it fails
the T.L.O. test for reasonableness, a student's remedies are still limited.'" If a
situation arises in the school environment that is of such gravity that a highly
intrusive search, urinalysis, is thought to be necessary,'4 it is recommended
that the test used to determine reasonableness be one of probable cause. Even
then, considering the alternative means available for controlling drugs such as
locker searches, detection dogs, clothing searches and the like, it may still fail
to satisfy judicial scrutiny. Whether urinalysis becomes widely implemented in
the schools will depend greatly upon how the courts interpret the TL.O. test
"'Anker, 607 F.2d at 589.
"'See supra note 4.
"See, Buss, supra note 22, at 776-77; State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
947 (1970); and Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
"'1W.R. LAFAVE, supra note 15, at 471.
42738 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984).
"4id. at 1464.
'"In a delinquency proceeding, the student may seek the protection of the exclusionary rule. However, the
question of whether evidence, seized illegally by school officials, can be suppressed via the exclusionary rule
is an open one. See, T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 739 n.3. In civil proceedings, a student may attempt to sue for viola-
tions of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1982). See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Potts v.
Wright, 357 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa. 1973); and O'Daniel, supra note 31, at 826.
"'While the T.L.O. Court indicated that its holding does not reach the question of whether individualized
suspicion is an essential part of the reasonableness test, it indicated that in certain circumstances outside the
school, there is no strict constitutional requirement of such. But it cautions that individualized suspicion has
only been dispensed with when the search was minimally intrusive. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 744 n.8.
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and how closely they examine the degree of intrusiveness in relation to the
grounds justifying a search at its inception. Unless we are prepared to admit
that schools are analogous to prisons, then school authorities will have to
forego the use of this highly intrusive testing technique.
JAMES J. CUMMINGS
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